Thai Takedown

30 January 2014 - Foreign Policy

Thailand is known for its dynamic economy, vibrant tourist industry, smiling hospitality, and pragmatism. But that’s hard to tell these days. On a recent walk near Siam Square, Bangkok’s iconic shopping and entertainment district, I watched a young, well-heeled woman gleefully defacing what remained of the signage in front of Thailand’s national police headquarters. In the square itself, the faces of speakers preaching hatred for the government flickered on countless looming flat screens. Trash cans had been plastered with pictures of incumbent Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her brother, ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra. These were only the most visible signs of long-standing political tensions that bubbled over in November.

Before 2001, Thai prime ministers had come and gone with predictable frequency. They would be elected by voters in the provinces, but then readily ousted by the Bangkok elite -- the military, the bureaucracy, the network surrounding the monarchy, and key business interests. The system appealed to the Bangkok elite, and provincial voters routinely failed to come together to collectively support their own interests. But that all changed with the arrival on the political scene of Thaksin, a billionaire telecommunications tycoon.

Thaksin hails from Chiang Mai, the cultural capital of Thailand’s north. Before he made it big, he was a police officer. Earlier than any other Thai politician, he recognized the value of tailoring his message to voter demands. He was the first to make use of modern polling and marketing techniques and was one of the earliest to recognize that the key to electoral success would be in capturing the vote in the country’s populous north and northeast, home to the fastest-growing segment of the Thai population -- urbanized villagers.

Although urbanized villagers are registered to vote in the countryside, they spend much of their time working in and around Bangkok’s industrial and service sectors; at the same time, the rural heartlands are rapidly urbanizing. The countryside has come to the city, and the city to the countryside. The urbanized villagers, Thaksin found, no longer wanted to work their rice fields -- they could hire cheap Burmese or Cambodian labor for that. Instead, they dreamed of sending their kids to college, and were ready to hustle two or three jobs to do it. Accordingly, he set out to win them over with virtually free health care, loan deferrals, and community development funds. The result: pro-Thaksin parties have won decisive victories in every Thai election of the last decade -- in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2011.

Thaksin was the first to make use of modern polling and marketing techniques and was one of the earliest to recognize that the key to electoral success would be in capturing the vote in the country’s populous north and northeast.

The old elite did not take his success lying down. By early 2006, Thaksin faced a range of accusations of corruption and human rights abuses in his government. Many of his former allies turned against him, starting yellow-shirted street protests to oppose his government and defend the monarchy, whose supporters believed Thaksin’s rise to be a challenge to royal standing. (Yellow is associated with Thailand’s widely-revered monarchy.) These events, which were relatively peaceful, set in train a bewildering sequence of color-coded political rallies, elections, judicial interventions, and military machinations that continues today.

Thaksin himself was ousted in a military coup in September 2006 while attending the UN General Assembly in New York. The courts dissolved his political party and banned him and his key allies from office for five years. Many voters, of course, would not be swayed: a rebranded version of Thaksin’s party comfortably won the first post-coup election and brought a stand-in, Samak Sundaravej, to power. The Constitutional Court then ousted Samak on the bizarre charge of his having illegally hosted a television cooking show. The courts abolished Thaksin’s political party once more, and this time the opposition, the Democrat Party -- which had lost the 2007 general election -- set up a government. Red-shirted pro-Thaksin protestors occupied parts of central Bangkok from March to May 2010, and faced a military crackdown that resulted in more than 90 deaths.

Tensions between pro- and anti-Thaksin forces subsided following the July 2011 election, in which Thaksin’s younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was elected prime minister. Pragmatic and soft-spoken, Yingluck confounded her critics with a penchant for compromise. She proved able to work well with both of Thaksin’s old adversaries, the palace and the army, latterly serving as her own minister of defense. Under her guidance, the factions made a deal: she could stay in office as long as she did not push the envelope on sensitive issues, such as the sacrosanct monarchy or the bloated military budget. Another implicit condition was that Thaksin, now living in Dubai, not return to Thailand. The deal between Yingluck and the establishment was never made public, and it tacitly excluded the opposition Democrat Party and the yellow- and red-shirt movements.

Until late 2013, everything seemed to be going well. On the surface, at least, Thailand was returning to normalcy. Then two things happened to disrupt it. First, Yingluck made her first serious political miscalculation. In the middle of the night on November 1, members of her party pushed through the lower house of Parliament a comprehensive amnesty bill for politically related offenses that had occurred between 2004 and 2013. The bill, which was opposed not only by the Democrat Party but also by many government supporters, would have paved the way for Thaksin’s return to Thailand. Prior to this episode, Yingluck had seemed to be her own woman, distancing herself from Thaksin’s more aggressive moves to secure a pardon. But the amnesty debacle suggested that she was ultimately beholden to her brother. Although Yingluck promptly killed the bill, her credibility was blown.

Second, recognizing that they had no chance of winning an election, Thaksin’s opponents rethought their strategy. Whereas former Democrat Party Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai had campaigned in the 1990s under the slogan “I believe in the parliamentary system,” in December 2013, all of the party’s members of parliament walked out and took up the street politics they had always professed to despise. Former Deputy Premier Suthep Theuksuban assumed the leadership of a new unified anti-Thaksin movement, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, which included the yellow-shirts. The PDRC quickly mobilized huge rallies in central Bangkok, drawing much of its support from the urban middle classes. According to an Asia Foundation survey, nearly two-thirds of the demonstrators had incomes of more than $1,000 a month -- good pay by Thai standards.

Thailand’s current political polarization both is and is not about Thaksin. He did not cause Thailand to change. Rather, he and his parties have identified and capitalized on a massive socioeconomic transformation, a shift in the aspirations of voters that has been underway for a couple of decades. Urbanized villagers are utterly weary of the relentless paternalism of Thailand’s capital city and its denizens. The PDRC repeatedly insists that Thaksin manipulated millions of uneducated, unsophisticated provincials into voting for him, five times in a row. Pro-Thaksin parties -- just like all other Thai parties -- have undoubtedly spent huge amounts of money to win elections, but electoral success on this scale cannot be bought. Like him or loathe him, Thaksin is simply the most popular Thai politician of the time.

Today, the PDRC urges reform and the end of corruption. But the Democrat Party has consistently opposed all manner of political reforms over the past two decades: the landmark 1997 people’s constitution was passed only after the party’s leader, Chuan Leekpai, was out of power. And Suthep’s vague current calls for a people’s assembly selected from different occupational groups sound like a reversion to authoritarianism, not a process of democratic reform. Further, for Suthep to reinvent himself now as an anti-corruption czar is deeply ironic: In 1995, he spectacularly brought down his own government after presiding over a notorious land reform program under which party cronies received land in Phuket meant for low-income farmers. He has denied any wrongdoing.

Yingluck has responded to the protests by calling for a snap election on February 2. The Democrat Party is boycotting it, and the vote may yet be postponed. Protesters already disrupted advance voting on January 26. And one protest leader was shot dead in Bangkok, the tenth person killed since the protests began back in November.

Under these conditions, an election will resolve little without a new agreement between rival factions. All must agree that elections and reforms are necessary, and that military coups and any form of violence are not. Yet, as law and order breaks down, such an accord seems far off. The army, which played a central role in allowing Yingluck to become prime minister in the first place, now looks likely to assume the role of power broker. Thailand’s generals, reluctant to stage a conventional coup d’état, which would make them a lightning rod for popular discontent in the countryside, will first try to find some middle ground, forcing Yingluck’s party to sign up for a thoroughgoing process of political reform and offering some face-saving concessions to allow the PDRC to wind down their protests.

Taking turns hitting at a Yingluck punching bag might provide some instant gratification for Bangkok’s frustrated middle classes, but these are the moves of people who are in deep denial about political realities: Thailand’s urbanized villagers are the country’s future, and they are not about to vanish. Thaksin is a deeply troubling figure, but so are some of the leaders of the anti-Thaksin movement. Rather than calling for vengeance and retribution, the protestors need to seek a compromise before violence claims more lives and erupts into open clashes on Bangkok’s streets.

The show must go on

30 January 2014 - The Economist

In front of the Royal Thai Army Club the thuggish rump of a failed people’s revolution gathered to collect their reward. They were to hear the announcement of a temporary interruption of Thai democracy, so that an appointed council of “good men”, as dreamed up by their leader Suthep Thaugsuban, could save the country. Mr Suthep, a former deputy prime minister with the opposition Democrat party, was to be disappointed.

There was already a stink of testosterone and aggression in the air. Young men, new veterans of a three-month-long protest against the government, were perched on lorries. They threatened by megaphone to storm the club and rid Thailand of the influence of the “Thaksin regime”, meaning Yingluck Shinawatra, the prime minister; as well as her brother, the former prime minister, Thaksin, whom they see as pulling the strings from his refuge in Dubai; and everyone close to them. The protesters are calling their own movement “The People’s Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State”. Here at the army club, miles away from the shopping malls and offices in the heart of Bangkok, Mr Suthep’s insurrection has to make do without the benefit of its more well-heeled supporters, the ones who post their revolutionary slogans on the walls of Facebook.

The army club made for an ironic venue. In the past its membership would have staged a coup and cut short the drama that was playing out inside. The prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra (now only the caretaker prime minister), was locked in talks with the election commission over whether to suspend a snap poll which had been scheduled for February 2nd. Before the meeting, the commission had cited the possibility of violence and disruption as a reason for its demand: to delay the poll for 120 days. The constitutional court had ruled just days earlier that the election could be postponed in accordance with the constitution, though their ruling was apparently without legal basis. So, it extemporised, any delay must be settled by agreement between the government and the election commission. The government, for its part, insisted that the poll must go ahead. It was not deterred either by the commission’s inability to organise advance polling in the capital Bangkok on January 26th or by the killing of one of the anti-government protest leaders.

A dozen ambulances were parked outside the army club, which created the strange sense that the imminent meltdown of Thailand’s democracy might have medical consequences. Then, as if on cue, a shooting: a self-appointed guard of the protesters was shot in the leg and packed off to hospital bleeding, the gunman apprehended from the back of a motorbike. But soon the attention turned from the blood on the pavement back to the scheduled event, inside the club. Soldiers had begun trying to talk protesters out of their siege.

Two hours later, after the army had dispersed the crowds from the scene, the government announced that it would go ahead with the poll. This was unexpected. It was just two days earlier that roving mobs of anti-government protesters managed to shut down all 50 of the polling stations open for early voting in Bangkok. Early polling went ahead in 66 out of 77 provinces, but only 440,000 people, or 22% of the 2m eligible voters, cast their ballot.

It is hard to see how further voting in Bangkok on February 2nd can proceed at all, unless the army protects polling stations. Even then, winning a landslide in elections that will be boycotted by the opposition would not appear to help the government. Indeed, as things stand, Ms Yingluck would not even be able to form a government. According to the constitution, 475 members of parliament are needed to convene parliament—and the protesters have prevented candidates from registering in 28 out of 500 constituencies.

But to defer the poll would have carried risks that the government must have judged intolerable. The pro-royalist Democrats have thrown in their lot with the street protesters. For now, they are prepared to see electoral democracy sidelined. Ms Yingluck’s main fear must be that the opposition step up its efforts to overthrow her by legal action. The Democrats have filed a case with the anti-corruption commission to impeach her over a controversial rice-pledging scheme.

Ms Yingluck’s supporters would hate to have seen the poll deferred. But it is a coup rather than the delay of another electoral victory that would push them to action. Two other factors supported the government’s decision to risk a showdown. First, an opinion poll shows that four out of five Thais intended to vote if an election were held on February 2nd. Second, American and Japanese diplomats have made it clear to politicians on all sides that Thailand’s frail democracy and its economic prospects must not be held hostage by an angry minority.

The government may now start to enforce its emergency powers in and around Bangkok, to be able to keep the polling stations open come Sunday, February 2nd. Arrest warrants have been issued for dozens of the protests’ leaders, including Mr Suthep. Or it might hold that card in reserve, giving the protesters further opportunity to discredit themselves, by denying their fellow citizens the right to vote.

Sadly neither option seems likely to resolve the battle on the streets. A measure of the mess is that Myanmar, only freshly emerging from its half-century of authoritarian rule, is expressing its own worry about the instability next door, in Thailand.

The new HKG Express

29 January 2013

I no longer write in detail about Asia's low cost airlines but Hong Kong Express' rebranding is worthy of note.

After ten years of operations Hong Kong Express Airways (HK Express) has transformed itself from a full-service operator to a low-cost carrier in less than a year. The airline is part of the HNA Group and a sister operation to Hainan Airlines and Hong Kong Airlines.

The intent was to reinvent the airline to better meet the demands of the local market and enable the group to better compete in the emerging low-cost sector in Hong Kong.

"We wanted to establish a new brand for HK Express to reflect and support the amazing transition that HK Express has undergone in the past year, and the fresh, youthful and dynamic sense that the new design inspires fits perfectly with our ethos as Hong Kong’s one-and-only low fare airline" said Andrew Cowen, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Hong Kong Express.

With Jetstar Hong Kong waiting in the wings it may not be HKG's  only low fare airline for long!

HK Express currently operates a fleet of five Airbus A320 aircraft with seating for up to 174 passengers. There are plans to increase the fleet by a further six aircraft this year and negotiations are currently taking place to finalise the acquisition of these additional aircraft. This will be just the first stage of expansion which will ultimately see the fleet grow to over 30 A320s by 2018.

With HK Express co-operating closely with its sister carrier Hong Kong Airlines and initially operating with a very similar brand, there have been concerns over possible confusion between the two businesses. The unveiling of the new corporate identity of HK Express does create a better structure for the group.
 

Thai elections to proceed - maybe

28 January 2014

Thailand's general election will proceed on Sunday despite warnings that it could end in violence and the country be left without a functioning administration for six months.

The decision to go ahead with the polls came at a meeting between Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and Election Commission officials; it is an election that Yingluck's party will almost certainly win. And to be honest the best riposte to the demonstrators would be for people to vote in huge numbers where they safely can.

There is still time for the courts to declare that the election cannot proceed. Though on what grounds is hard to determine.

As part of their campaign, the protesters have been disrupting election preparations and early voting. In some constituencies, candidates have been unable to register and there is unlikely to an elected quorum to open parliament and choose a government.

"The election result might not yield enough seats. It might take four to six months to convene parliament," said Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, an Election Commission official.

The Election Commission said it would hold by-elections until all parliamentary seats are filled. That could take up to six months and it will leave Thailand with a government that cannot pass laws or a budget.

In particular, it means Yingluck will struggle to find the funds to pay a mounting bill for the controversial rice buying scheme.

The Election Commission has argued that the country is too unsettled to hold an election now. Which really is not the election commission's job!

"We fear that there will be clashes on election day," said election official Somchai. He is probably correct. But the vote will proceed as normal in over 80% of the country. And there is only one party boycotting the election. Everyone else is involved and participating.

The government declared a state of emergency last week and has issued an ultimatum to protest leaders that they face arrest by Thursday if they do not give up areas of Bangkok they have taken over.
 
However, a Bangkok criminal court rejected the government's request for an arrest warrant for 16 protest leaders, including leader Suthep Thaugsuban. Bizarre. The court said that there was insufficient evidence. I guess they do not watch tv.

Suthep this evening has called on his PDRC across the country to prevent the election from taking place by whatever means possible. Someone really needs to arrest him.

The Guardian imitates Thailand's the Nation
26 January 2014

I never thought I would see the day when the Guardian prints an article as poor as anything from the risible Nation newspaper in Thailand. But yesterday they did and it was a shocker.

While protesters were blocking people from voting in Thailand, The Guardian ran an article saying that the protesters are "democratically minded" http://gu.com/p/3m6g5/tw

It was one of the most-lop-sided pieces of nonsense that the Guardian has ever published. The article was written by a Bangkok based expat who is a regular on twitter where until yesterday he had an anti-Thaksin hate slogan as his twitter profile? So we know where he is coming from anyway - though maybe the Guardian did not.

It is an article of falsehoods and make believe. The surprise is that the Guardian would publish such nonsense supporting a far-right, monarchist, anti-democratic movement controlled by Thailand's elites.

Since 1932, Thailand has been a democracy with a constitutional monarchy - but there have been at least 18 coups; military and legal together with years of military government. Thailand's people's constitution of 1997 had been replaced by a military drafted constitution re-enforced by a constitutional court appointed by non-elected Senators who appear to be the real power in the country.

The article is designed to mislead. It is true the current political crisis in Thailand is complex, but this propaganda piece simply sets out a flag for dictatorship. To deal with the worst errors:

1.The protesters are not particularly diverse and have never numbered more than 200,000 despite the organisers claims of millions. The main elements are the depressingly myopic Sino Thai middle class, imported Southerners (in large numbers) and vocational students, the latter are notoriously violent. It is untrue that Bangkok's working class supports the protest's objectives; this is supported by the near equal voting numbers in Bangkok between Puea Thai and the Democrats in the last election.

2.The concept of a powerful unelected elite (royalists, judges, generals, tycoons) in Thailand who cling to the status quo and are opposed to electoral democracy has been much discussed by historians, academics and journalists. The majority of the protestors are not of course part of the elite but rather they are the on the ground troops; happy with pocket money and selfies; some will make the argument that they are there to eliminated corruption because that is what their media is telling them. Installing a peoples council chosen by Suthep is not going to remove corruption from Thailand. Suthep Thaugsuban, is unlikely to have launched his campaign without a clear endorsement from certain highly placed people. His task is to cause chaos and undermine the government as background to a slow judicial coup with hostile decisions from courts packed with supportive royalist judges.

3.Clearly the Yingluck government has made several foolish errors and under pressure has withdrawn the umbrella amnesty. If Suthep had halted the protest at that point there would have been considerable credit due to him. But as time has gone by it has become clear that it is democracy itself which is detested.

The Democrat Party from which Suthep recently resigned has proved incompetent and unelectable. It had almost three years from 2009 to effect change. It did nothing. Lacking the vision and will to reform itself it has looked to military coups and partisan courts to achieve power. Its English public school boy leaders Abhisit and Korn have been incapable of reforming their party and presenting sensible and attractive policies to the Thai people. Instead they claim a distance from the protestors and then embrace them.

4.Parties associated with Thaksin have won election after election because, notwithstanding his very real faults, he gave self respect and political participation to the Thai rural majority. It may well be that Thaksin will have to remain in permanent exile. But Puea Thai increasingly has its own voice now. The north of Thailand has new sources of wealth and a new self respect. They have become politically smart (the 2007 constitutional referendum is evidence of that - they did not support it but knew it was better to accept it to hasten an election).

This protest movement is most certainly not pro democracy. But it does have some ardent farang supporters.


Davos - junket

24 January 2014

Here is The Economist's take on the junket taking place in Davos, Switzerland this week:

"Of the 2,622 hobnobbers invited to this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, just 15% are women. Two-thirds of the delegates hail from Western countries that are home to just 12% of the world’s population. Counting delegates from academic institutions produces an alternative university ranking—with Harvard right at the top. Some 60% are businessfolk and 14% come from government. The 46 presidents and prime ministers represent 1.8 billion of the world’s 7.1 billion people. One in eleven is a hack—four from The Economist. The total worth of the 15 richest is around $285 billion.

The stockmarket value of firms represented is $12 trillion, about one-fifth of the world’s total. And after all the inflated expenses and egos, what has been the fate of the companies that sent delegates at least three times in the past five years? Those 104 firms underperformed both the S&P 500 and MSCI World Index. Time to get back to work."

It is a junket. And the media is at fault for giving the junket ever greater credibility by sending an army of reporters to Switzerland for cosy interviews around log fires. I hate to think what the total bill is. But the conversations that are held could be covered on Skype and the money better spent on people that need it.

What It’s Like To Be A Woman At The Old Boys Economic Forum

Thailand's never ending messy story

24 January 2014

Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled on Friday that the country’s upcoming elections — which protesters have worked feverishly to block — can be postponed if the government reaches agreement with the Election Commission.

It was a bit bizarre. The Election Commission had petitioned the court to rule that the election should not proceed. And the court turned around and said to the Commission that they had to sort it out with the PM.

The decision surprised many legal scholars who say there are no provisions under Thai law for a delay.

Some constitutional experts described the decision as a form of judicial “coup d'état” because it would leave a potential power vacuum if elections are not held.

An aide to Ms. Yingluck said on Thai television that the government would study the court’s decision. But he also seemed to leave the door open for negotiation with opposition forces, especially the Democrat Party, which is boycotting the elections.

Explaining its decision, the court said in a short statement that the constitution “does not absolutely mandate that the election day cannot be rescheduled.” Remember the constition under discussion is the 2007 army -drafted post coup constitution.

Thailand’s Constitution requires that elections be held “not less than forty-five days but not more than sixty days from the day the House of Representatives has been dissolved.”

The elections are scheduled for Feb. 2, a few days before the 60-day period expires.

Protesters have blocked the registration of candidates in more than two dozen districts and this week stopped the Election Commission from training election workers in Bangkok.

The protest leader, Suthep Thaugsuban has pledged to “obstruct” the elections at all costs. With early voting starting on Sunday it is likely that polling stations will be heavily blocked especially in Bangkok and the South.

Ms. Yingluck’s government faces not only the wrath of protesters but hostile government agencies. The Election Commission, which requested the judgment that the Constitutional Court issued Friday, has repeatedly sought a postponement of the elections.

The Constitutional Court has ruled against the government on several key decisions in recent weeks and is perceived by government supporters as highly political. In November the court overturned a constitutional amendment to make the Senate a directly elected body on the grounds that procedures were not followed and that it was an attempt to “overthrow” the democratic system. In fact it would have simply returned the Senate to its status under the 1997 "peoples" constitution.

In analyzing Friday’s decision, Pornson Liengboonlertchai, a scholar at Chulalongkorn University who specializes in constitutional law, echoed the views of other experts in saying the court appeared to be making law, rather than interpreting it.

“The power to postpone elections does not exist in any part of the Thai Constitution at all,” Mr. Pornson said on Thai television. “The court itself is trying to establish this power.”

It is still very likely that the 2 February election will be postponed as it is clear that it will not solve anything. But if the election is delayed then  Peua Thai should want something in return. After all they had no obligation to dissolve Parliament. Peua Thai should insist that the Democrats confirm their participation in the election and that the PDRC leave the streets or at least limiting their protests to more defined areas and cease obstructing government offices.

If these guarantees are not made the why postpone the election? At least the election would give the government some legitimacy. Even though the new Parliament will not reach the required minimum number of members because protesters blocked the registration of candidates in many provinces in southern Thailand. More than two dozen by-elections will need to be held before Parliament can elect a new government. This will delay convening Parliament for at least two or three months.

One way or another decisions are needed in the next few days.

For both sides, it's time for a strong reality check

22 January 2014 Pravit Rojanaphruk in The Nation

Since the Bangkok shutdown operation was launched by the anti-government People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) in a desperate bid to oust the government, many people have taken to assessing the political situation on a daily basis - if not more often - and have kept a close watch on the latest words from PDRC secretary-general Suthep Thaugsuban, caretaker Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and military top brass. In such a period of crisis, however, we also need to try harder to look at the bigger picture.

Lack of trust, empathy and the denial of reality seem to pervade Thai society today - and readers might notice it if they are not too busy learning the latest route the PDRC will march along today.

The lack of trust was manifest in the instant finger pointing that followed every bomb explosion last week. Without an iota of trust, both sides are more than ready to summarily conclude that evil can only come from the other party - never mind if no proper investigation has begun in the seconds after the blasts.

There's also an acute shortage of empathy on both sides. On social-media sites such as Twitter and Facebook, anti-government protesters have time and again recalled how red-shirt protesters allegedly set fire to Central World back in 2010, in contrast to their "peaceful" protest today. This writer reminded some of them that arson only occurred after nearly a hundred people, mostly reds, had been killed.

While PDRC supporters demanded Yingluck step down immediately after one of their comrades was killed in the blast on Friday, none called on then PM Abhisit Vejjajiva to resign after 99 were killed over the months of April and May 2010.

On the reds' side, some pro-government red shirts expressed "satisfaction" on social-network sites that a PDRC supporter was killed. It's tragic that people on both sides of the political divide are losing their humanity due to political hatred.

To make matters worse, many are not openly talking about the other "big issue", which has attracted so much hatred against Yingluck and her older brother, ousted and fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra. We have all heard about corruption at rally sites, and the Thai media widely reported it, but what about the sense of insecurity over the future of the monarchy among protesters, with His Majesty at 86 and frail?

Those visiting the protest sites cannot fail to notice a good number of protesters wearing T-shirts with royalist slogans like: "People of HM the King" or "[The person] whom I love the most is the King" and that many such T-shirts are widely available on sale at protest sites. On January 13, the first day of the "shutdown", I heard a protest leader on stage at Victory Monument declaring out of the blue that they would ensure the King would remain the head of state. Why such insecurity and why so little public discussion about it?

Another big denial of reality is the belief that if Yingluck was to simply resign today, everything would be fine and reds would just happily obey the orders of the PDRC's "People's Council" that would, under Suthep's plan, be appointed to run the country for a year and a half.

It's time Thais stopped believing our society can break through the political impasse without confronting these issues.

Why Thai politics is broken

21 January 21st Banyan in The Economist

After more than three months of anti-government protests in Bangkok, which are increasingly being scarred by violence, the government has imposed a state of emergency in Thailand's capital and surrounding provinces. This may make it hard to hold the snap election the government had called for February 2nd. In any event, the main opposition party will boycott it. So it will not end Thailand’s political confrontation. The government’s opponents now openly campaign for a temporary interruption to Thai democracy so that an appointed council can make reforms to “save” it. But in the recent past other undemocratic solutions—a military coup in 2006 and a judicial one in 2008—failed to provide a durable solution. Why has the political system broken down?

The two sides would answer this question differently. For the government’s opponents, Thai democracy has been hijacked by Thaksin Shinawatra, a tycoon and former prime minister now in self-imposed exile, having been sentenced to jail in Thailand for corruption. But parties loyal to him keep on winning elections—in 2001 and three times since. The latest incarnation is led by his sister, Yingluck. Before Mr Thaksin’s emergence, Thai government alternated between fractious, corrupt coalitions and fractious, corrupt military dictatorships (the army has made 18 coup attempts since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932). Thanks to a new democratic constitution introduced in 1997, however, Thaksinite parties can win elections even without coalition partners, thanks to votes from the populous north and north-east of the country. Critics accuse the Thaksins of massive corruption and of bankrupting the country with populist policies. For Mr Thaksin’s supporters, however, the problem is that he has threatened the interests of the old Thai establishment, represented by the civil service, the army, the judiciary and the monarchy. They portray the protests as an anti-democratic backlash from a privileged class under threat.

Both explanations have some merit. Thaksinite governments have tended to rule in their voters’ interests, not the whole country’s; and their opponents are not just from a well-heeled elite. Thai society is split. But not quite down the middle: Thaksin loyalists do win elections. Thai politics has broken down because the compact on which democracy is based—that losers will accept the result until the next election—no longer applies. Large, influential sections of Thai society find rule by the Thaksin family simply intolerable. They will use almost any tactic to unseat it, including accusing it of disloyalty to the much-revered king, Bhumibol Adulyadej. That the king is 86 and frail, and his presumed successor, the crown prince, is unpopular, and seen as perhaps susceptible to Mr Thaksin’s influence, fuels the sense of panic in the opposition.

The election, if it takes place, will result in a landslide for Miss Yingluck, but change nothing. The opposition will hope she can be overthrown by a coup, or by legal action (an anti-corruption commission is investigating her). But a government run by Mr Thaksin’s opponents, such as the one in power from 2008 to 2011, will be illegitimate and unstable. And the longer the to-and-fro continues, the more fundamental will appear the divisions in Thailand, which are not just social, but also cultural and even ethnic and linguistic, between fairer-skinned southerners, many with some Chinese ancestry, and northerners, who speak a version of Thai closer to Lao. So the protests threaten not just peace and stability, but the very integrity of Thailand.

Staff travel misfiring

20 January 2014

Emirates new staff travel concessions have backfired badly - instead of motivating staff (especially given that the bonus program has become a myth) EK has managed to take value away. Worse they dressed this up as a significant benefit; which means they do not understand how the majority (cabin crew) of their staff travel and what they really wanted.

Introducing the new staff travel program the company Chairman said "I'm extremely delighted to announce expanded Staff Travel benefits that recognise your commitment and passion to make us the best in the business." I fear he has been deeply misled by EK management. He would not have made such a rosy statement if he realised the storm of complaints that have flooded in from angry and disappointed Emirates staff.

EK have said that all staff may buy up to 15 tickets a year for extended family or friends. These are classified as special tickets. Staff and direct relatives may still purchase Cat A (standby) or Cat C (firm) tickets. Special tickets are priced much higher than Cat C - as we will see below they are proving more expensive than public prices through emirates.com.

But at the same time as the new special tickets were announced:

i)  There is on average approximately a 20% increase on Cat A and Cat C fares (the industry ID90 and ID50) fares.

ii) and Cat C Wider Eligibility and Cat 99 tickets have both been withdrawn.

Additional problems: cabin crew still cannot buy a discounted J fare yet staff of other companies can and do. EK cabin crew and immediate family fly economy.

Staff looking at flight bookings to make a firm booking are finding that Special Tickets are often available (at the higher fares) while CAT C firm (concessional) are not available on the same flight. When staff are looking to return from leave and flight loads are high they have always looked at options for a firm booking. That is much harder now except using special fares.

Worse: a check on the emirates.com website can reveal that a regular ticket (with FF points) is in fact cheaper than the "Special ticket" fare. As one employee noted: "Same Date Special ticket DXB-KHI-DXB= 1215 Fly Dubai DXB-KHI-DXB= 850 Emirates.com 1155 ??? No comments."

There are plenty of other fare comparisons showing that the special fares are simply too expensive. But prices do vary and are commercially sensitive so I will not repeat them here. Just as an aside looking at those fares reminds me how frustrating it is that fares through Dubai are so much cheaper than fares that originate in Dubai.

Why would you anyone book these 'special' tickets knowing that a simple visit to Emirates.com will achieve cheaper results! Staff, family and friends are being charged MORE than the public. Absurd.

In a forum posting on "Life at Emirates" someone said: "Profit share only exists on paper, staff travel is a joke, days off are few and far between, Dubai is too expensive even for the basics."

The majority of EK's crew are expats so clearly staff travel is important. Many staff relied on cat 99 and wider eligibility tickets for visiting families. Removing the Cat 99 will hurt a lot of people; the fares offered a definate seat (except in the rarest of circumstances) at a price that was cheaper than ID50/CatC. It was an ideal ticket to help close family members to travel.

Staff travel is one of the easiest and cheapest ways to keep moral of an airlines workforce high. EK need to do some damage repair as this all looks like maximising revenues at the expense of EK's own staff.

It looks like more EK crew will be spending their days off in Dubai rather than traveling to see family.

The Financial Times calls for Thai elections to proceed

20 January 2014

In an editorial last week the Financial Times came out strongly calling for elections in Thailand to proceed.

The editorial noted that "in Thailand the demonstrators are not demanding more democracy but less."

Both the Financial Times and the International Crisis Group, the non-governmental organisation, noted that due to the protests  “the risk of violence across wide swaths of the country is growing and significant”. The FT continued "Such violence, were it allowed to happen, would have serious repercussions across the region. Thailand was one of the earliest Asian nations to adopt democracy and is southeast Asia’s second-largest economy. As neighbouring regimes such as Vietnam and Cambodia tighten their domestic grip, Thailand remains one of the few free countries in the region. That reputation may now be at risk."

As the FT said "the temptation of many outsiders has long been to say to government and opposition leaders: “A plague on both your houses.” " But that is not satisfactory; Thailand is too important an economy to be allowed to descend into civil war and too important a Western ally to be allowed to come under greater Chinese influence.

For the FT the solution is straightforward and "the starting point must be to recognise that Ms Yingluck’s government is democratically elected and is willing to contest an election next month. The opposition should therefore commit itself to the electoral process and abandon violence."

That is not going to happen. The Democrats are irrevocably tied to Suthep's mob. Indeed Suthep was the deputy PM in the military backed government ousted by Puea Thai in 2011. Meanwhile the Democrats continue to damage themselves and their country whose flag they claim as a symbol of their cause,

The perils of national service

19 January 2014

Mandatory military service is coming for Emirati nationals after the President, Sheikh Khalifa, ordered the Cabinet to draw up a bill for a new national defence and reserve force.

The new law will require all males who have finished secondary school or are over the age of 18 and under 30, to undergo military training. The training will be optional for females.

Emirati males who have finished secondary school will be required to serve nine months, while those without a diploma will serve for two years.

The reserve force will be made up of those who have completed their national service and military personnel who have finished their service in the armed forces.

“Protecting the nation and preserving its independence and sovereignty is a sacred national duty. The new law will apply to everyone,” Sheikh Mohammed tweeted.

I do have reservations about how this will be seen and how it will be implemented. On one hand military service may be a good thing for under-employed Emirati youth. However there is a real risk of creating a more militarised state.

Perhaps one solution will be for UAE military service to include components for civilian-led deployments such as logistics, healthcare and education. This may achieve the same purpose without the weaponry and uniforms.

Of course this is for Emiratis only though there is also a risk that it creates a greater friction between Emiratis and the majority expat population who do not serve. It is hard to assess how the news has been received - but in 7 Days one student said: “I love my country but I’m unsure about how this new mandatory law will fit into my life. Nine months is a long time, and I will have to put my career on hold after university to accommodate the military service. I’m glad I don’t have to do two years as I have a diploma. I’m sure I’ll learn a lot during the service, but I don’t really like the idea of anything being mandatory."

There is little doubt that national service can hold people back from developing their professional careers. This has been a problem in Singapore for many years. It can also take out a great deal of individual thought and creativity in favour of compliance and obedience.

Sheikh Mohammed added that a reserve force to help the UAE army will be created from the graduates of the military service.

I have always thought that a professional military, like any career, is best served by those who want to be there.

Confession: I do have a bit of a prejudice here as I objected to my school's compulsory combined cadet force program!

The din of misogyny at Bangkok protests

17 January 2014 Thomson Reuters Foundation Author: Thin Lei Win

In fiery speeches at protests calling for her ouster, Thailand’s first female Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has been called ugly, stupid, a bitch, a slut and a whore.

A university professor recommended sending a large group of men to “sexually snare” her. A decorated doctor offered to give her vaginal repair surgery and to change her sanitary pads, and said she could become a nude model because she hasn’t yet reached menopause.

Not to be outdone, the head of the country’s Election Commission (EC) drew laughter from reporters after suggesting in a condescending tone that a meeting with her might only be possible if it was arranged at a certain hotel where her opponents claim she had an as-yet-unproven extramarital affair.

These offensive comments - made by public officials and others who hold jobs that require some sort of ethics and professionalism - weren’t made in hushed tones. They were shouted from stages set up at the anti-government rallies, published in daily newspapers, pronounced on television shows and gleefully shared through social media.

Yingluck is the younger sister of Thaksin, the former premier and a telecoms billionaire who was ousted in a 2006 coup and is in self-imposed exile following corruption charges. Protesters say she is a puppet for her older brother, who is pulling the political strings from abroad.

Since Yingluck was elected in 2011, anger against Thaksin has fallen to her, and her English language skills, her appearance, and her abilities as a mother, woman, and wife have been dissected and mocked.

Former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva - an Eton- and Oxford-educated politician who heads the opposition Democrat Party - even joined the fray last year, referring to Yingluck as “stupid bitch”.

The base misogyny has become louder and more vitriolic since protests against Yingluck’s Pheu Thai party-led government gained momentum in early November and as protesters blockade major intersections in Bangkok, with non-stop speeches on stages set up in different sites. Crude, photoshopped posters calling Yingluck names - or showing her with phalluses - are common.

The insults have stung the prime minister, and in December, the political turmoil brought her to tears at a press conference - fueling the protesters to further ridicule her.

“Whoever could be in my position for one day would know how it feels,” she told journalists on Friday at a press conference.

These comments aren’t just coming from men. Plenty of women have joined in, oblivious to the fact that by making the statements or condoning the men who make them, they’re saying it’s OK to use sexist insults to attack, degrade and belittle women in public.

“Vitriol and invective have become common in Thai politics and sexist, homophobic innuendos and personal attacks have been committed by fervent supporters on both sides of the political divide,” said Kaewmala, a Thai social commentator and writer.

Yet she was still surprised that “such an abject vulgarity, the explicitly sexual language” were coming from persons of high status.

“That’s a new low in Thai political discourse,” she told Thomson Reuters Foundation.

For Pravit Rojanaphruk, a regular columnist for the English-language daily The Nation, the misogyny reflects “a deep-rooted patriarchal culture in Thai society, even amongst people who claimed to uphold morality”.

Of course, public figures should face criticism of their performance in office.

Criticise all you want policies like the rice intervention scheme - whereby the government bought rice way above market prices in order to help farmers - that sparked allegations of graft and waste. Go ahead and lash out at the ill-advised amnesty bill that would have allowed Thaksin to return home a free man.

However, sexism and misogyny should be off limits - not just against Yingluck but everyone across the political spectrum. A pro-government Red Shirt’s threat to kidnap the army chief’s daughters - which was criticised by other Red Shirts and for which the offender later apologised - is equally unacceptable.

Thailand, which allowed women to vote in 1932 and became one of the earliest countries in the region to do so, is going down a dangerous path by allowing the use of misogyny as a political weapon. Who’s to say it won’t spill over to everyday lives?

It’s already an uphill struggle for female victims of physical and sexual violence to get a sympathetic ear, let alone justice. There’s no need to worsen the situation.

It's a shame that amidst the whistles, posturing and propaganda from both sides, common decency has been lost.

Like two countries

17 January 2014 - The Economist

In Thailand, governments are made in the provinces and unmade in the capital. The unmaking part has always come relatively easy. Five weeks ago, mass protests in Bangkok against the government forced the prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, to call an early election. Her Pheu Thai party, which is the third incarnation of a party founded by her brother, the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was prepared to win it. And so the protesters, led by Suthep Thaugsuban, a former deputy prime minister of the opposition Democrat Party, returned to the streets on January 13th. They are now demanding that the very process by which Thailand (usually) chooses its governments—ie elections—be junked.

The poll called by Ms Yingluck is still scheduled to happen on February 2nd. But it is looking unlikely to go ahead. For a start, the Election Commission does not want to hold it on that date. Then the pro-royalist Democrat Party is boycotting it—not because it would be unfair (though it might be), but because it would lose. Mr Suthep instead wants to give a “people’s council” of “good men” 18 months to run Thailand, time for them to implement a fuzzy reform agenda whose main objective is to rid the government of the whole Shinawatra family. As it stands Ms Yingluck holds the first position on Pheu Thai’s candidate list, followed by her brother-in-law, in the second spot, and then her cousin, the current foreign minister, in fourth place.

The government actually has offered to delay the poll, but only if Mr Suthep calls off his campaign. But he seems to have foresworn negotiating and this week he boasted that he has enough cash to fight the “Thaksin regime”, as he calls it, for a year. Mr Suthep also called for the prime minister herself to be “detained”. The rhetoric from the protesters’ podiums at the capital’s main intersections is getting nastier. From one, a speaker, a university professor, called for the sexual assault of Ms Yingluck.

The government’s strategy has been to back off and wait for Mr Suthep’s tantrum to end. It has become hard to envision a compromise. For Mr Suthep’s followers another government voted in by rural voters from the north and north-east (whom they often call “water buffaloes”) would be intolerable. Equally intolerable, to Ms Yingluck’s supporters, would be the unelected return of the Democrats, whose political enemies tend to call them “cockroaches”.

Ms Yingluck must fear that violence in the streets might trigger a coup. The pressure has been mounting. On the day before the anti-government protesters began this most recent phase of their drawn-out campaign to shut down Bangkok and force out the Shinawatras, Ms Yingluck was reported to be mulling resignation. The story goes that it was her brother Thaksin who talked her out of it, over a Skype call from his refuge in Dubai.

The Shinawatras may be loathed by the traditional elite (and millions more, who hope someday to join it) for treating the state as an open till, but they still hold the cards. Paralysing a city the size of Bangkok is an impressive feat, requiring great numbers. But there were probably at least as many pro-government supporters out and about in the provinces. They are calling for the government to go ahead with the election as it was planned. Thida Thavornseth of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) says she has asked her supporters to refrain from wearing the red shirts that have become their symbol. Her goal is to avoid violent conflict, but she warns that the UDD would resist a coup.

Postponing the elections, which is probably unavoidable, will open a bundle of legal questions. Most crucially, it might be that in the case of a delayed election the king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, has the authority to appoint an interim prime minister. This is a scenario Ms Yingluck’s Pheu Thai party is keen to avoid. To her red-shirted supporters it would be as intolerable as a military coup. One part of the army sides with the provinces: these are the “watermelons”, green on the outside, red on the inside. It is with a view to this division that some news agencies have taken to murmuring about the possibility of a civil war.

It seems that only the king will be capable of shutting down Mr Suthep. But the 86-year-old monarch’s vigour is fading, and so too is the role of the palace. It has at times provided an anchor for Thailand’s frail democracy. But the hope that a proper system of checks and balances would evolve in its shadow has been dashed in recent years. The establishment, led by the monarchist Democrats, regards the red-shirt movement as an unwashed rabble in the sway of Mr Thaksin. In fact they are a broad-based response to a broken political system.

Mr Suthep may or may not achieve his objective. He is likely to be ruined either way. If he wins, and imposes a parallel government, he could well be assassinated. If he loses, he will be charged with treason, and could hang. The Democrats do not have a discernible strategy. For now, the party is along for a ride hoping that the next government will be formed by some means of selection other than a legitimate election.

For instance, large numbers of Pheu Thai politicians could be banned from standing for office. The anti-corruption commission is pressing charges against 308 former MPs and senators, most of them from the Pheu Thai party, for voting to make the upper house fully elected (a court had ruled in November that such a change would be unconstitutional). But at this point the chatter of a judicial coup is meaningless. There is at present no parliament at all, such as might be closed down or filled by new elections. More likely, delaying the vote would give Pheu Thai the chance to adjust to any adverse finding from the commission by naming new candidates for office.

Until the next royal succession, the current political conflict is likely to ebb and flow, but not to be resolved. The inevitability of a successor coming along relatively soon makes the prospect of a coup unattractive for the army. To stage a coup and then back an appointed government, as the army did in 2006, would only be safe for as long as the current king is alive. The day the crown prince accedes to the throne he could oust the coupmakers and appoint his own lot of generals. So unless protesters shut down airports or disable crucial infrastructure the army will stay put. It must also fear a backlash by the red shirts and however many enlisted men and officers are loyal to them.

The irony has probably not escaped the generals. If Mr Suthep is successful he will probably hasten the decline of the very thing that he claims to want to protect—the monarchy.

A constitutional history lesson

16 January 2014

Much of the Democrats and whistle-blowing noise from Thailand is addressed at Peua Thai's attempts to review the 2007 constitution.

So lets look at how the 2007 constitution came to be:

Thailand's Constitution Drafting Assembly approved a final draft of a new constitution Friday 6 July 2007, paving the way for an August 19 constitutional referendum and for possible general elections in December 2007.

The drafting assembly comprised of 100 members, all appointed by the military after the 2006 coup. The assembly unanimously approved the 309-article draft presented by the 35-member Constitutional Drafting Committee in April.

The new constitution was part of an effort by the ruling Council for National Security (run by the military after the 2006 coup) to decrease populist influence by reducing the impact of elections, which plotters of last year's coup blame for bringing former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra into power.

Under the proposal, the Thai House of Representatives would be reduced from 500 seats to 400 seats, 320 of which will be directly elected and 80 appointed from the party list. A multi-seat constituency system will also replace single-member districts. The proposal also seeks to eliminate direct elections for members of the Senate, who will be instead appointed by national and provisional committees composed of bureaucrats and judicial officials, and will reduce the number of senators from 200 to 150.

The new draft effectively tore up the 1997 constitution. After Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai dissolved parliament in November 2000, Thaksin's TRT had won a sweeping victory in the January 2001 elections, the first held under the Constitution of 1997. At the time, some academics called it the most open, corruption-free election in Thai history.

Interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont ordered government officials to promote support for the draft and the military-controlled parliament passed a bill in July 2007 to penalize any obstruction or opposition to the referendum.

If the draft constitution had been rejected by the referendum, military leaders were authorized under the interim constitution imposed after the 2006 coup to simply revise the earlier constitution to achieve the same objectives as the new draft.

Here were wise words from the Economist in August 2007

"Not a vote for the generals - From The Economist print edition

Thailands' army chiefs seem to have overestimated their popularity, as military dictators often do. They staged a massive propaganda effort to get people to turn out and vote in August 19th's referendum—the country's first ever—and to say yes to a new constitution written by a military-appointed panel. Yet the turnout was a tepid 58%. And though the constitution was approved, the yes vote was just 57%. Some of those voting yes will have done so only because the passing of the constitution paves the way for elections, promised for December. They were voting to hasten the end of the military dictatorship, not to express support for it.

The referendum showed that Thailand remains deeply divided: in the poor and populous north-east, a stronghold of Thaksin Shinawatra, the elected prime minister deposed in last September's coup, 62% voted to reject the charter. In the south, a stronghold of the Democrats, the main opposition in the last elected parliament, the yes vote was 88%....

The prospect of a reborn Thaksinite party leading the next government is surely not one the generals would relish. The plan, it is assumed, was that after TRT's demise Thailand would return to the weak and short-lived coalition governments that had preceded its rise to power in 2001. Several changes in the new constitution—such as the merging of single-seat constituencies into larger ones in which the second- and third-placed candidates would also win seats—seem designed to give lesser parties more of a chance and thus increase the likelihood of unstable multi-party coalitions.

If so, the royalist-military elite who staged the coup would be able to return to exerting influence behind the scenes, as they did in pre-Thaksin times.....

In the generals' worst nightmares, the Thaksinites win control of the government and use their power to fix things so that Mr Thaksin gets off his corruption charges and his ban from politics is lifted. Then they amend the just-approved constitution to remove the amnesty that it grants to the coup-makers. It seems unlikely that the army will let this happen.

A compromise is still imaginable, for instance if a PPP-led coalition chooses a more emollient prime minister....

Several more months, at least, of uncertainty lie ahead. By the time the election is held—assuming it goes ahead on schedule—Thailand's political agony will have dragged on for two years. This has taken a toll on the economy, which is expected to grow by only 4% this year, much less than the rest of South-East Asia. Even in this respect, the generals cannot boast that they have done better than the politicians."

Thailand’s anti-democracy protests should provoke a harsh rebuke from the U.S.

16 January 2014 The Washington Post Editorial

The Post's editorial will no doubt provoke the usual "foreigners do not understand Thailand" rants - yet foreigners, with access to thoughtful media and the opportunity to discuss subjects that are taboo in Thailand, may understand Thailand all too well.

"Popular demostrations against democracy are becoming an unfortunate trend in developing countries where elections have challenged long-established elites. The latest case is Thailand, where thousands of people took to the streets Monday to demand that the country’s freely chosen government step down, that an unelected council take its place and that elections scheduled for next month be canceled. The protesters’ strategy appears to be to disrupt Bangkok to the point at which the government will feel compelled to resign or be removed by the military.

Similar tactics have succeeded in bringing down two previous governments led by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters since 2006, while a third was forced out by a dubious court decision. This time, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Mr. Thaksin’s sister, is standing firm, as she should. But she could use more support from the United States in rejecting an undemocratic outcome to the crisis.

Ironically, what amounts to a coup attempt is being supported by many in the opposition Democratic Party. The party’s problem with democracy stems from its failure to win an election since 2001, when Mr. Thaksin’s movement first surged to power. The Democrats represent Bangkok’s middle and upper classes and the traditional business establishment linked to the royal family. Mr. Thaksin, a billionaire businessman who now lives in exile, is a populist who draws support from previously disenfranchised Thais — the poor in urban areas and the rural northeast. While he did abuse power and commit human rights abuses when he was in office, his governments were freely and fairly elected, as was Ms. Yingluck’s.

In a decade of political and street conflicts, the Thaksin movement has seemed to mature: Ms. Yingluck’s administration was proceeding relatively smoothly until she attempted to pass an amnesty bill through parliament that would have allowed her brother to return home. The opposition, meanwhile, has grown more radical. No longer do its leaders claim, as they once did, to be liberal democrats who seek only to correct Mr. Thaksin’s abuses. Now they aim explicitly at installing a regime that would empower a minority while seeking the “eradication” from politics of Mr. Thaksin and his family.

Opposing such an agenda ought to be an easy call for the United States, which has close economic and security relations with Thailand. But as was the case when Egyptians sought to provoke a coup against their elected government last summer, the Obama administration’s response has been weak. A State Department spokeswoman called Monday for the crisis to be resolved through a “democratic process” and praised the government’s “restraint” in responding to the demonstrators.

The administration has not, however, made clear publicly that a coup — whether by the military or the street mobs — would be unacceptable to the United States or that it would result in a suspension of aid and security cooperation. U.S. law mandates such a cutoff, but since the administration declined to observe the statute following Egypt’s military coup in July, Thailand’s anti-democracy militants may be emboldened to believe that they, too, will be tolerated by the Obama administration. They shouldn’t be. As has been the case in Cairo, the victory of the anti-democracy forces would only lead to more violence and instability."

Who Lost Thailand?

16 January 2014 -  Project Syndicate: Yuriko Koike, Japan's former defense minister and national security adviser, was Chairwoman of Japan's Liberal Democrat Party and currently is a member of the National Diet

Thailand, Southeast Asia’s most developed and sophisticated economy, is teetering on the edge of the political abyss. Yet most of the rest of Asia appears to be averting its eyes from the country’s ongoing and increasingly anarchic unrest. That indifference is not only foolish; it is dangerous. Asia’s democracies now risk confronting the same harsh question that the United States faced when Mao Zedong marched into Beijing, and again when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ousted the Shah in Iran. Who, they will have to ask, lost Thailand?

Much of the world is wondering how such a successful economy could allow its politics to spin out of control. What accounts for the armies of protesters – distinguished, gang-like, by the color of their shirts – whose mutual antipathy often borders on nihilistic rage?

The roots of the current unrest extend back more than a decade, to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s first electoral victory in 2001. Thaksin’s triumph did not represent the normal alternation in power that one finds in a democracy. Instead, his victory heralded the political rise of the country’s poor, long-silenced rural majority. Bangkok’s entrenched elite recoiled in alarm.

But, instead of learning to compete with Thaksin for the votes of Thailand’s rural poor, the country’s urban elite (including the powerful military) sought to delegitimize his rule. When he was re-elected by an even larger majority, his government was overthrown, his political party was banned by the Supreme Court, and he was forced to flee the country after corruption charges against him led to a criminal conviction.

Yet Thaksin’s supporters did not abandon him. When Thailand’s military returned to their barracks, many Thai citizens voted for Thaksin at one remove, with his sister – Yingluck Shinawatra, a long-time executive at Thaksin’s communications firm – becoming Prime Minister, supported by a powerful parliamentary majority.

For much of her term in office, Yingluck garnered praise for her pragmatism, and for seeking to ameliorate the antagonism of her opponents. But that praise and success appears to have bred a form of hubris. She proposed an amnesty law that would have not only pardoned opposition leaders, including Abhisit Vejjajiva, her predecessor as prime minister (who faces murder charges), but allowed her brother to return to the country. And, in defiance of a Supreme Court ruling, she sought a constitutional amendment that would make the Senate, whose members are appointed, an elected body.

The opposition, sensing that its moment had arrived, launched a wave of street protests. Yingluck, in an effort to defuse the situation, called for a parliamentary election in February. But the opposition has rejected this and says that it will boycott the vote. It fears – rightly, most people suspect – that the Thaksin camp will be returned to power in any free and fair vote.

So, in essence, what is happening in Thailand is an attempted nullification of democracy by the opposition and the country’s entrenched elite. Unable to compete successfully with Thaksin for votes, they now want to dilute Thai democracy in order to prevent the electorate from ever again choosing a government that goes against their will.

If Thailand were an insignificant country with little geostrategic weight, its problems might not matter as much as they do to the rest of Asia. But Thailand is Southeast Asia’s lynchpin economy. It is a key partner for Myanmar (Burma) as it makes its own political and economic transition, and it is a hub for trade with neighboring Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

But the biggest reason that Thailand matters for Asia’s democracies is fierce competition for influence between a rising China and the democratic world. Until now, Thailand has been a firm member of the democratic camp. Its military is mostly trained by the United States; indeed, it was the key staging point for the US during the Vietnam War. Likewise, Japan and India have long regarded Thailand as a democratic bulwark in a neighborhood where some regimes – Cambodia and Laos – are firmly under China’s hegemonic sway. Indeed, its government has proved to be a strong supporter of Myanmar’s president, Thein Sein, as he seeks to free his country from China’s tight embrace.

By standing aside as Thailand’s opposition and traditional elite seek to undermine the country’s democracy in the name of a permanent right to rule, Asia’s democracies risk driving some elements of the Thaksin camp into the arms of China, which would happily accept the role of patron to so potent a political force.

But this need not happen. Thailand’s military has long and respectful ties not only with the US military, but with officers in Japan as well. Thailand’s opposition politicians, many of whom were educated at top Western universities, may also be open to quiet advice that they are pushing things too far, not only putting Thailand’s stability at risk, but also jeopardizing regional security.

Just as, a decade ago, the West objected to the efforts of Turkey’s entrenched secular elite to rob Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s mildly Islamist AKP party of its democratic victory, it needs to speak clearly today in defense of Thai democracy. The opposition’s claim that it is acting in the interests of the world’s democracies needs to be rebutted.

Thaksin may be no saint, and some constitutional reform will be needed if political reconciliation is to come about. But Thaksin’s governments, like that of his sister, have kept China at one remove from influence. That is the key strategic interest that is now at stake.

Should Yingluck be ousted in a coup, or should the country’s democracy be hollowed out to preclude her return to power, the Shinawatras may be left with no choice but to seek support from Thailand’s giant neighbor to the north. If that happens, we will all know who lost Thailand. We did.
 

What's behind the Thai protests?

15 January 2014 Fareed Zakaria on his GPS show on CNN

GPS speaks with Duncan McCargo, a professor of Southeast Asian politics at the University of Leeds in the UK and author of 'Tearing Apart the Land,' about the ongoing protests in Thailand, what the demonstrators are hoping to achieve, and whether the military is likely to intervene.

Anti-government protesters in Thailand have launched a campaign to “shut down” Bangkok. What are they so unhappy about, and what are they trying to achieve with this latest demonstration?

The protesters are unhappy about the political direction which Thailand has taken for more than a decade. In the past, Thailand was run by a relatively small Bangkok-based elite which I term “network monarchy,” centering on the palace, the military, the bureaucracy and major business groups. While electoral politics have been the norm for more than 30 years, elected governments needed the blessing of this network in order to remain in office. Without this endorsement, governments quickly collapsed – or were removed by military coups. Conservative groups in Thai society, including the Bangkok middle classes and voters in the upper South – stronghold of the Democrat Party – have normally backed the ruling network.

Since the 2001 general election, however, most Thai voters have consistently supported parties linked to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Pro-Thaksin parties with strong backing in the populous North and Northeast won solid majorities in the 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2011 general elections. The Democrat Party squeaked a narrow election victory in 1992, but has not won convincingly since 1986. Protestors are furious that Bangkokians no longer have veto power over election results; indeed, they feel they are no longer in control of “their” country. They claim that Thailand has been held hostage to the corrupt financial interests of Thaksin, his family and his cronies. The real picture is much more complicated. Voters in the North and Northeast are no longer poor farmers, content to be marginalized and patronized by their “betters” in Bangkok. Thaksin has not created the wave of electoral resentment against the Democrats and the power of the capital city. He has simply tapped into that resentment for his own ends.

The protestors appear to have no clear political agenda other than a desire to “return” Thailand to an imagined pre-Thaksin era in which the ruling network and its supporters can still call the shots, and provincial voters can be marginalized. In the short term, they are trying to provoke a military coup of some kind.

There was a lot of skepticism when Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra took office in August 2011, with many expressing concern that her election would simply enable Thaksin, her self-exiled elder brother, to exercise influence through the back door. Have these concerns been borne out?

There’s no doubt that Thaksin has remained an influential figure, working through and behind the Yingluck government. But Yingluck hasn’t been Thaksin’s “clone,” as he originally hoped, and there has been ample evidence that she was often able to set her own agenda and to form her own political alliances. In particular, it’s clear that her government couldn’t have lasted nearly 30 months without receiving an informal green light from the traditional establishment. An elite deal was in place between Yingluck, the network and the military to paper over Thailand’s political divides and allow for “business as usual.” This deal partly collapsed as a result of the abortive move to push through amnesty legislation in late 2013 – where Thaksin clearly overplayed his hand – and partly because the Democrat Party and anti-Thaksin forces set out systematically to sabotage the pact.

How can and should Yingluck’s government respond to these protests? What do you see unfolding in the coming weeks?

All Yingluck can do is continue the current policy of being very reasonable and diplomatic, not unnecessarily escalating matters, but pressing firmly ahead with plans for an election. It would be very useful if academics or other respected figures in Thai society could help to broker some sort of compromise solution to avert potential violence.

The military has played an active role in Thailand’s political past, including overthrowing Thaksin’s government in 2006. Do you see it playing a significant role in the latest unrest?

The reluctance of the military to intervene directly in the present crisis has illustrated the residual strength of the longstanding deal which kept Yingluck in office. The military is well aware that a coup would only further exacerbate Thailand’s polarized politics, and that the Army would be blamed for whatever went wrong. Nevertheless, the protestors will try their best to push for such an intervention in the days and weeks ahead – since a military coup would be the best means for them to advance their agenda.

Bangkok Shutdown - 2

15 January 2014

So many have no clue what they are protesting about but they look the part.

Bangkok Shutdown -1

13 January 2014

Suthep's four remaining followers - and even one of those is a redshirt!

No room for reason in a storm of whistles

8 January 2014 The Nation Pravit Rojanaphruk 

Waving a gigantic Thai national flag, blowing whistles en masse and calling themselves "the great mass of the people" - this is how the anti-government People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) project themselves to the world.

These symbols and name, if read critically, offer food for a disturbing thought, however.

The use of the Thai national flag, for a starter, declares their patriotism. However, when used against fellow Thai citizens, it is akin to an attempted monopolisation of patriotism and implicitly suggests that the other side - who are in fact also Thais - may be unpatriotic or even "un-Thai".

This resulted in a unpleasant reaction late last year when a picture of red shirts on a pickup truck carrying a Thai national flag sans the blue stripe, the symbolic colour of the monarchy, appeared on social media. While the authenticity of such a flag could not be independently confirmed, some royalists took it seriously enough and I read a commentary on a major newspaper condemning such an act.

On Twitter, I asked: How can Thais use the national flag as the main symbol in a fight against fellow Thais? And does this suggest they're fighting a "foreign" enemy?

One Thai PDRC supporter and royalist using the account @pampam_northcap tweeted back saying: "Betrayers of the monarchy do not deserve to be Thai."

Such a sense of self-righteousness can also be extended to the PDRC's planned shutdown of Bangkok. Since they're patriotic and flag-waving, they must think they can do whatever they like.

The blowing of whistles, meanwhile, may be a desperate attempt to call for attention, but its deafening noise suggests a one-way communication. It implicitly says: "You must listen to me, but I will not hear you."

The deafening sound of the whistle means nothing more than the blaring out of anger. Again, it doesn't matter if it disturbs others, as the whistle blowers are "patriots". It always boils down to the belief that any means is justifiable to achieve a "righteous" goal.

On the Internet, some opponents have now christened it the "whistle of hatred", as PDRC members target people they hate or who work for the ousted and fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra as the subject of their whistle blowing.

Then there's the feel-good characterisation of PDRC supporters as "the great mass of the people", which is deceptive as in fact it might be more accurate to describe them as "the great mass of the minority", or the "great mass of the middle-class and elites".

This is because they're not the majority - not that a minority has no rights, but the use of the term "great mass" masks the fact that 5 million or 10 million people are in fact a minority in a country of nearly 70 million. This reflects their insecurity regarding their number, vis-a-vis the rest of the population.

It is easier to shut your eyes and ears and blow a whistle and shut down Bangkok than to open your hearts to dialogue and try to win others through reason.

I fully respect the PDRC's right to boycott the election, but the PDRC has no right to suppress others' right to vote - unless they think they're superior to the rest. It is hoped that they're not too busy blowing whistles or shutting down Bangkok to hear such a simple message and think about their legitimacy or lack thereof.

Boeing's hollow victory: The company got the vote it wanted, but at what cost?

8 January 2014 OpEd in the Los Angeles Times

The narrowly approved contract agreement between Boeing and its Washington state workforce will be hailed by some as a victory for the canny, hardball brinkmanship of Boeing's management and the knuckle-under economic pragmatism of the International Machinists Union.

But the steep cutbacks in retirement and health benefits that tens of thousands of Boeing workers were forced to swallow have far larger implications for middle-class America.

Boeing's stingy treatment of its highly skilled workforce offers a vivid example of how America's new economy has created gaping economic inequalities and steadily squeezed the economic life out of the U.S. middle class over the last three decades, even as corporate profits and CEO pay have skyrocketed.

Boeing's case epitomizes that sharp economic divide. For just as the company was wringing concessions from its workers, its board of directors approved a 50% increase in the company's stock dividend and a $10-billion stock buyback that will richly reward investors and executives who get paid in Boeing shares.

Boeing contends that it is not the first to impose such concessions but that it is merely following the market.

True enough. In 1980, 84% of American workers at companies with 100 or more employees received lifetime pensions from their companies, and 70% got health insurance fully paid for by their employers. Today, fewer than 30% have lifetime pensions and only 18% have fully employer-paid health insurance.

What these numbers mean is that every year hundreds of billions of dollars in benefit costs have been shifted from company books to the pocketbooks and checkbooks of average Americans, helping to boost corporate profits and to leave roughly half of the baby boom generation facing near poverty in retirement.

Boeing's new contract will accelerate that trend. And it's not as if hard economic times forced Boeing to slash labor costs. Its profits and demand for its planes are at record levels.

Over the last decade, Boeing rolled up more than $35 billion in profits and paid no federal corporate taxes. In fact, Boeing reaped about $2 billion in federal tax rebates from 2003 to 2012, as well as the most generous long-term state tax subsidy in U.S. history from Washington state.

For President Obama and others who advocate a fairer, faster-growing economy, it is instructive to understand how Boeing put the screws to its 56,000 workers around Seattle and Everett, Wash.

In a take-it-or-lose-your-jobs ultimatum last November, Boeing declared that if its current workforce wanted to build the next generation of 777X airliners, it would have to agree to about $1 billion of cuts in previously promised pay increases for younger workers, to sharp increases in employee contributions to healthcare, and to a massive restructuring of Boeing's retirement plans. Boeing said it was freezing its pension plan, shifting tens of thousands of machinists into a far less generous 401(k)-type plan, and would then steadily reduce company contributions, year after year.

When that formula was put to a vote in November, the company's 31,000 rank-and-file machinists rejected Boeing's terms by a vote of 2 to 1. Boeing was ready, perhaps even eager, for that outcome, and despite Washington state's offer of $8.7 billion in tax concessions, Boeing invited other states to bid on hosting the 777X production.

By Christmas, Boeing had lured 22 states into a massive job auction, ready to reward the lowest bidder — the state offering the lowest tax rate, lowest worker benefits and wages, and lowest cost to Boeing (i.e, largest state subsidy) to finance the $10-billion cost of new aircraft plants.

Some experts questioned the wisdom of Boeing's tactics. After all, making modern airliners requires thousands of skilled, well-trained engineers and machinists, experienced at designing and weaving together the most advanced materials and complex engineering of the 21st century.

Boeing said it had to cut costs to meet "aggressive international competition." But Boeing's sole major global competitor is Airbus, based in highly unionized Germany and France, and Airbus puts a premium on maintaining its high-quality workforce and treating its workers generously.

German companies over the last 25 years have raised the pay and benefits of middle-class workers five times faster than U.S. companies. And German corporations have kept high-tech jobs at home, so that today 21% of Germany's workforce is in manufacturing versus 9% in the U.S. What's more, the German strategy has rolled up $2 trillion in export surpluses while the U.S. has suffered $6 trillion in trade deficits.

Inside Boeing, some people must have had some second thoughts. Even while noisily threatening to move out of state, Boeing sweetened its offer to its Washington workforce. In late December, it added an estimated $1 billion in value, restoring previous pay scales for newer workers and upping the contract-signing bonus to $15,000 per worker. But Boeing still insisted on steep retirement and health benefit cuts.

Local union leaders opposed the new package. National union leaders called for a second vote last Friday, and the Boeing contract passed narrowly, by 51%. Some union leaders hope to gain leverage and better terms once the 777X goes into production.

But rolling back the clock on the shrinking middle-class share of America's economic pie has proved virtually impossible lately. For now, the Boeing formula represents the kind of successful corporate power play that prompted Pope Francis recently to chastise modern capitalism for imposing "the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose."

Hedrick Smith is the author of "Who Stole the American Dream?" and former Washington bureau chief of the New York Times.

NACC's utterly predictable ruling

7 January 2013

The National Anti Corruption Commission (NACC) will press impeachment charges against 308 of 381 former MPs and senators for their role in the passage of the charter amendment draft on the composition of the Senate.

The NACC was asked to consider a petition seeking impeachment of 383 politicians after the Constitution Court on Nov 20 ruled the draft charter amendment seeking to change the make-up of the Senate to a fully elected chamber violated Section 68 of the 2007 (post-coup, army led) constitution, which prohibits attempts to overthrow the monarchy and unconstitutional efforts to seize power.

Remember this was no more that a charter amendment seeking to return the senate to its status under the 1997 constitution.

Of the 308 former MPS and senators (former because Parliament has been dissolved pending the 2 February elections) who would face charges, 293 were involved in proposing the unconstitutional draft and voting to pass the first, second and third readings of it, while 15 others voted in some or all of the three readings but did not take part in proposing the draft, NACC member and spokesman Vicha Mahakhun said.

The NACC decided not to press charges against the other 73 legislators including caretaker Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Mr Vicha said a nine-member committee voted 7-2 to dismiss impeachment requests for 73 other legislators including Ms Yingluck because most of them only voted to pass the bill in the third reading and were not involving in proposing it

The 308 politicians are due to report to the NACC on Jan 15-17 to acknowledge the charges, Mr Vicha added.

The nine members of the NACC are appointed by the Senate; they believe they are justified in stopping elected officials from passing legislation.

If found guilty of abuse of power the 308 MPs and senators could be banned from politics for five years. 2008 revisited.

Legal rulings have played a pivot role in Thailand’s turbulent politics in the past and officials of Ms Yingluck’s party have warned the government could fall victim to a judicial or military coup.

Pheu Thai spokesman Anusorn Lamsa-ard said the MPs charged were only doing their duty. “They were MPs and their job was to issue laws,” he said, not unreasonably.

Asia's LCC boom

5 January 2014

Years ago I used to maintain detailed pages on this site documenting the growth of Asia's LCCs. The growth of the airlines and my move to Dubai meant this was just to hard to maintain. 

Over the last ten years the Asia-Pacific region has seen a rapid influx in the number, size and reach of low-cost airlines. The Centre for Aviation says 2014 will see “a record level of start-up activity.” There’s already about 1,000 aircraft operated by LCC across the region and a further 1,591 new aircraft are on order.

Ten LCC startups are planned for 2014, bringing the total in the region to around 60. But growth also is coming from within established low –cost carriers such as Air Asia.

The LCCs follow the Air Asia catch line - now everyone can fly. Taking on Asia's quality legacy carriers the LCCs have made flying an affordable option for millions who would not have flown previously.

Asian LCCs now account for 20 percent of the seats in the Asia-Pacific market. But they make up for 50 percent of the aircraft orders.

The AirAsia group leads LCC with an in-service fleet of 172 aircraft. Next is Indonesia’s Lion Air with 133. The Jetstar group is the third-largest LCC with a fleet of 116 aircraft.

Lion and AirAsia placed more than 60 percent of the orders for the 1,591 new aircraft (most are narrow-body aircraft and large turboprops). The Jetstar Group placed 125 orders.

The 10 new LCC launches targeted for 2014 in Asia-Pacific include Thai AirAsia X, Thai VietJet, NokScoot, AirAsia India, Jetstar Hong Kong, Spring Airlines Japan, China United Airlines, Jiu Yuan, Tigerair Taiwan and a yet to be named LCC subsidiary of TransAsia Airways. Last year saw five new LCC startups.

It is worth noting that two of the start ups are long haul LCCs from already established airlines; both are based out of Bangkok's old but revived Don Muang airport.

China United is a subsidiary of China Eastern and is a re-launch of a full-service airline. The others are new airlines; seven culled from existing LCC groups and pulling the genes out of the parental hat.

North Asia is the next big growth market for LCC. They now account for only 10 percent of the seats within the region. Jetstar Japan and Peach are now well established out of Narita and Osaka and have been joined by Vanilla.

Two issues that will limit the pace of growth are both related to infrastructure; firstly air traffic control limits; limited airways can only manage so much capacity. This is particularly true in China; possible also in Indonesia.

Secondly there are few smaller, unutilised airfields available to the LCCs. If you want to fly to Hong Kong or Singapore only one airfield is available. In Tokyo the LCCs have to use Narita; where the fare to the airport may be the same as your airfare.

Canada’s bitter, small-minded foreign policy

3 January 2014 Peter Jones in the Globe and Mail

(This is a sorry tale of a nation that once played a significant role in world affairs - one comment left on the Globe and Mail's web page sums up how many Canadians see their country: "Harper told Canadians that we would not recognize Canada when he was finished with it, that is the only promise he has kept. Not only do intelligent Canadians not recognize the Great Country that Canada was, but neither does the rest of world recognize Canada. Canada no longer stands for peace, decency and respect for human rights in the eyes of the rest of the World.)

Good relations with the United States are a core foreign policy interest. Yet, even while most Canadians have, sometimes grudgingly, accepted the benefits of a deeper economic relationship with the United States, we have sought through multilateralism and the promotion of new ideas to portray ourselves as somehow different (and superior). This has led to some tiresome mantras and not a little childish grandstanding over the years. But, as someone who travels frequently to many parts of the world, and particularly to many troubled parts of the world, it has also created a sense of Canada in the world that is quite powerful and unique.

What is not generally appreciated is that this approach is not merely self-indulgent; it serves a core interest. Working to strengthen multilateral organizations, supporting the development of norms of conduct in international affairs and contributing to peace and good governance around the world are not simply “nice” things to do – a rules-based international order, expressed through an interlocking web of institutions and commitments, benefits Canada.

A predictable world order where things like trade and security play out according to rules (admittedly something observed more in the breach in many parts of the world) is a world in which smaller countries have a better chance of advancing their interests. This is quiet, patient, painstaking work that rarely generates headlines. Progress is incremental and measured in years. It is less emotionally satisfying to some than yelling at the world from the rooftops. But it makes a contribution, over time, to creating a world that serves Canada’s interests.

The Conservatives have stood this on its head. In making foreign policy a reflection of their domestic approach to governance – finding wedge issues with which to detach segments of the population and play to their fears and angers – the Conservatives have given us a bitter, small-minded foreign policy. There are a few notable exceptions, such as the promotion of gay rights internationally, but most of the Conservative approach is centred on angry assertions of simplistic moral absolutes that play well to certain domestic constituencies, but contribute nothing to the world or to unifying Canadians behind a positive vision of their place in it.

With issues such as Israel, Iran, religious freedom and more, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government is not interested in what Canada can actually do to help in any modest way. It is interested in what bluster and noise it can make to impress a key domestic constituency that it hopes to attract or retain as part of its “base.”

Ironically, all of this undercuts what the Conservatives should recognize as an overriding foreign policy objective: good relations with the United States. For example, President Barack Obama’s administration currently has a tough job trying to both find a nuclear deal with Iran and promote compromise between Israelis and Palestinians. Both issues are key to avoiding wars in the Middle East in the next decade. The administration needs friends and allies who will quietly roll up their sleeves and help look for answers. What it gets from Canada is bluster and intransigence, as the Conservatives hew to the dictates of the Israeli right in hopes of securing votes in Canada.

Of course, Mr. Obama does not represent the totality of the U.S. political scene. In taking the views they do, the Conservatives are mirroring elements of the U.S. right, especially its Tea Party segment. But is this in Canada’s interests? Has anyone checked out the Tea Party’s views on things like protectionism and free trade recently? It would be a disaster for Canada if this faction ever came to power.

This drives home the central reality of Mr. Harper’s foreign policy: It is about his party’s short-term, narrowly defined domestic political interests. It is about negative campaigning and the politics of fear and division. The only good thing one can say (and it is a pretty damning indictment) is that the Conservatives have managed to make Canada so irrelevant to the key issues on the world stage that we can do little damage by taking these positions – except to ourselves.

Peter Jones is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He is also an Annenberg distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
 

RAK Airways suspends operations indefinitely

1 January 2014

UAE’s RAK Airways has announced the suspension of all operations starting January 1, 2014, and until further notice.

In a written statement today [Tuesday], the airline said: “The decision for suspending operations was taken following increased pressures on the carrier’s performance due to continuous market conditions, increased operating costs and the impact of the regional political instability on the overall aviation industry.”

‘‘The board of directors took the decision today to suspend the operations until further notice. We believe this decision is in the best interest of the airline and its shareholders. We will take this time to re-evaluate the best options available for RAK Airways future as well as those that fit the industry requirements of the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah.”

RAK Airways current network included flights from RAK International Airport to Doha, Peshawar, Islamabad, Lahore, Jeddah, Riyadh, Calicut and Kathmandu.

RAK Airways regrets the inconvenience caused to its customers as a result of this decision. All passengers who have made bookings with RAK Airways will be re-booked on alternative airline or receive full refund for any payments made.